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This essay uses ideological criticism to examine how and why victimage, 
identity and nationalism are produced through everyday discursive practices 
of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Wander contends that the ideologi-
cal turn in criticism confronts and studies what is professed and obscure, 
and Greene argues that part of this criticism involves unmasking forms 
of domination. Examining cultural or rhetorical narratives is part of ideo-
logical criticism. The narratives in this study can be regarded as competing 
vernacular memories representative of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. The 
participants invoke personal and collective memories with oﬃcial national 
histories to explain contemporary victimization as a continuance of histori-
cal victimage. This use of the past can serve to legitimize their national and 
political claims, as well as to justify violence against the other group, since 
historical victimage provides a rationale for hating the other group and per-
petuating a vicious cycle of violence. 
It is imperative to look at how personal and collective memories in-
teract with oﬃcial national histories as mutually reinforced and entangled to 
produce coherent victimization narratives. Through constant reproduction 
of historical victimage in vernacular discourse, participants re-aﬃrm their 
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respective identities, realities, claims, and righteousness. Some researchers 
have documented the positive aspects of victimage narratives and identity,
but unfortunately the narratives that are examined here foster hatred toward 
the Other. However, this extreme feeling does not arise out of primordial 
tendencies, but out of fear from the Other and a desire to eliminate the 
perceived threat. 
While one purpose of this essay is to explore victimage narratives, 
another goal is to critique objectivist approaches to the study of history and 
collective memory. This relationship between history and collective memory 
has been a heated and on-going interdisciplinary dispute. Ideological criti-
cism can be considered part of this debate. Considering collective memory 
to be mythical, while history is objective, posits a dichotomous view, which 
is especially dangerous when history and collective memory are invoked to 
support or disprove victimage. 
Traditionally, work on Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia has tended 
to follow this kind of reasoning, dwelling on the notions of factual truth, 
objective history and victimage, and how these get distorted and used for 
political purposes. Therein, collective memories of the groups within Kosovo 
and former Yugoslavia are contrasted with objective history, and “true vic-
tims” are clearly distinguished from “proven villains”. I will elaborate on this 
further in the essay. Many authors write about the “destructive” power of 
collective memories in Kosovo and the rest of former Yugoslavia, and how 
activating some of them has been cause for war. For example, some authors 
have argued for a monolithic Serbian culture that is somehow pathologi-
cal.
However, most of the studies on Kosovo and former Yugoslavia have 
looked only at oﬃcial discourses, such as elite political speeches, media cov-
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erage and history books, and have used these as representative of all groups 
and voices. To my knowledge there have been few studies of Kosovo, and 
the former Yugoslavia, which focus on the analysis of daily discursive prac-
tices through which ideologies of historical victimage are reproduced. Even 
less attention has been devoted to how personal and collective memories 
interact and amalgamate with oﬃcial historical narratives in vernacular 
rhetoric to create the historical victim identity. Several scholars in the ﬁeld 
of communication have recognized the prevalent focus on “powerful” dis-
course with “historical” signiﬁcance, and the corresponding neglect of ver-
nacular communities. They have called for more studies that give voice 
to previously silenced discourses and have acknowledged the illuminating 
insight that arises out of taking vernacular discourse seriously.
From an ideological perspective the issues outlined above are prob-
lematic, because they not only silence and delegitimize certain voices, while 
ratifying others, but also provide for simplistic understandings of how ver-
nacular memories interact with oﬃcial histories to produce conﬂict-sus-
taining narratives. This leads to ineﬀective conﬂict resolution, of the kind 
we are witnessing in Kosovo and Bosnia, and helps perpetuate the cycle 
of violence. 
Therefore, this critical study analyzes vernacular discursive practices 
of historical victimage instead of focusing on privileged and dominant dis-
courses. Rather than judge the truth value of the participants’ narratives, 
it aims to illustrate how their claims are constructed in discourse and the 
pragmatic aspect of the historical victim identity, in terms of aﬀording sym-
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bolic, emotional and political resources on a personal, collective and na-
tional level. 
This ideological essay is divided into several sections. The ﬁrst seg-
ment engages the debate over the relationship of history and memory, as it 
relates to victimage. The next part analyzes the Serb and Albanian vernacu-
lar rhetoric in terms of discursive strategies used in creating the historical 
victim identity. The third section explores the functions of these historical 
victimage narratives, and attempts to demonstrate why examining them is 
important in understanding not only the intractable conﬂict in Kosovo, but 
also other conﬂicts around the world. By the end of this essay I hope to 
demonstrate the importance of problematizing explanations that posit sin-
gular, preferential, and “objective” victimage in relation to conﬂict interven-
tion and resolution.
The relationship of history and collective memory to victimage
History and collective memory are often thought of as being in opposition 
to each other in terms of objectivity/subjectivity, and present/past orienta-
tion and concern. Such a view follows Halbwachs, who, in the ﬁrst work 
on collective memory, diﬀerentiates profoundly between history and col-
lective memory. He sees history as an objective process, which seeks to 
record the past, to know it and understand it. Collective memory, on the 
other hand, Halbwachs explains, is not comprised of objective facts, but 
of tradition. Following Halbwachs, many theorists make a clear distinc-
tion between history as objective, systematic and scientiﬁc, and collective 
memory as mythical, constructed and distorted. In contrast to history, it 
is particularistic and time-bound, concerned with experience and feeling 
instead of cognition and knowledge. Markovits and Reich say that it “is 
most deﬁnitely a phenomenon of the present”, while “history is a matter of 
the past”. While history records the past, collective memory re-interprets 
it for presentist goals.
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How collective memory is viewed within this position is not contested, but 
its oppositional relationship to history as objective is problematic. This view 
sets up a false dichotomy, wherein vernacular memories, narratives and ex-
periences are measured against a truth standard. This provides for “objec-
tive” diﬀerentiations between the truly oppressed and the genuine tyrants. 
However, we must not forget that victims and perpetrators are self-ascribed 
and shifting categories. As Feldman remarks, “rarely does a pure victim 
face oﬀ with a pure aggressor on the world historical stage. The dyad ag-
gressor/victim merely signiﬁes two forms of victimage or victims turned ag-
gressors, confronting each other in symbiotic gradations of a generic subject 
position”. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that reasoning of the type outlined 
above has led not only to black-and-white explanations of the conﬂict in 
Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia, but has had signiﬁcant implications in 
international diplomacy, NATO intervention and conﬂict resolution ef-
forts in the region. It has helped solidify and legitimize certain narratives of 
victimization, while silencing and delegitimizing others. As Montalbano-
Phelps explains, narratives of victimization are judged according to so-
cietal standards of who can be the victim and what victimization is like; 
narratives and victims that do not conform to the norm are discarded as 
being fabricated and fake. A clear example, if we look at both media cover-
age and academic interest concerning Kosovo, is the proliﬁc and widespread 
writing about the victimization of Albanians at the hands of the Serbs, in 
stark contrast to the scant and unpopular, even contested, writing about the 
victimization of Serbs at the hands of the Albanians. 
Traditional scholarship on Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia,
tends to pay signiﬁcant attention to the power of collective memories, and 
 Feldman, “Political terror”, .
 Lori Montalbano-Phelps, “Discourse of survival: Building families free of unhealthy 
relationships”, The Journal of Family Communication , no.  (), -.
 See among others, John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, ); Payam Akhavam and Robert Howse, eds., Yugoslavia, the former and 
future: Reﬂections by scholars from the region (Washington: Brookings Institution, ); 
Ivo Banac, “Foreword”, in Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The disintegration of Yugoslavia 
from the death of Tito to the fall of Milosevic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, ); Vic-
toria Clark, Why angels fall: A journey through Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kos-
ovo (New York: St. Martin’s Press, ); Bogdan Denitch, “Dismembering Yugoslavia: 
Nationalist ideologies and the symbolic revival of genocide”, American Ethnologist 
(), -; Andre Gerolymatos, The Balkan wars: Conquest, revolution, and retri-
bution from the Ottoman era to the twentieth century and beyond (New York: Basic Books, 
); Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, war and the Great Powers -
(New York: Viking, ); P. Gowan, The twisted road to Kosovo (Oxford: Labour Fo-Balcanica XXXVI 88
activating them for political purposes. Yet, in a general attempt to disprove 
certain versions and legitimize others, they point out the validity/invalidity 
of claims and narratives in relation to an “objective” and “unbiased” history. 
Former Yugoslav historians have been accused of playing a signiﬁcant role 
in the wars, because their writings engaged them, and their respective na-
tionalist political elites, in power struggles over renditions of history. As 
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history is vital to the existence of a nation, disproving the Other’s history 
is tantamount to denying the Other’s national identity. Yet, most of the 
writing by “outsiders” (primarily Western authors) on former Yugoslavia has 
been plagued by the same contestations over who is telling the truth and 
who is not. 
The connection between collective memory and oﬃcial national his-
tories has been examined in a top-down manner exclusively, looking at of-
ﬁcial political discourses, media coverage and history books as representa-
tive. The assertion is that political elites were the ones who tailored the 
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nationalist historical discourse, which people bought into. This presents 
collective memory as static, and denies agency to the people who create, 
reproduce, negotiate and contest oﬃcial discourses through narratives of 
vernacular memories. Few studies have analyzed vernacular discourses in 
Kosovo and former Yugoslavia, wherein personal and collective memory 
fuse with oﬃcial historical discourses. 
The importance of such an analysis is crucial, because, as Judah points 
out, in Kosovo “history is war by other means”. History is not a subject 
that is conﬁned to books, the classroom, and academic debates – it is a 
live, and wild creature, that is both shaped according to present realities 
and inﬂuences their interpretations. While the boundary between collective 
memory and history is blurred, both Serbs and Albanians make a distinc-
tion, which reﬂects their acceptance of history as objective and memory 
as fabricated, and their preoccupation with denying validity to the Other’s 
history, nation and identity. When referring to their own version of events, 
participants call it history, while when explaining the Other’s side, they 
term it memory, emphasizing its constructed, and therefore false, aspect. 
This exempliﬁes the point that the very notion of what constitutes history 
and what comprises collective memory is determined politically, that it is 
indicative of power struggles in society and that it has signiﬁcant political 
implications. As Conway remarks, the battle over the validity of memory 
is actually a struggle for the legitimacy of identity.
Because of the problems arising out of the false dichotomy between 
history and collective memory and its relation to conﬂict and victimage, I 
rather agree with Sturken who proposes that memory and history should be 
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Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo”, European Journal of Communication ,
no.  (), -.
 Judah, Kosovo, .
 Victoria J. Gallagher, “Remembering together: Rhetorical integration and the case 
of Martin Luther King, Jr. memorial”, The Southern Communication Journal  (), 
-.
 One of the key factors in such power struggles in Kosovo has been the destruction of 
Orthodox heritage, as a means of disputing the Serbian claim to the land.
 Brian Conway, “Active remembering, selective forgetting, and collective identity: The 
case of Bloody Sunday”, Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research , no. 
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regarded as entangled. As Katriel demonstrates, “the analytical categories 
of ‘history’ and ‘memory’ can be viewed as dialectically related: a historical 
orientation both builds on and transcends individual memory, and a mem-
ory orientation both incorporates and refashions historical knowledge in 
making it part of an encompassing, commemorative project”. Thus, mem-
ory and history exist in relation to and not apart from each other. History 
and memory are both highly selective, impartial and constructed. They are 
social, rhetorical constructs, changeable in relation to time and place, which 
make the past coherent and usable in the present.
Moving away from epistemology 
Instead of examining oﬃcial narratives and ascertaining the truth value of 
collective memories and national histories, this ideological study looks at 
vernacular discourse as a site where historical victimage is created and re-
produced. It rejects the notion that objectivity is the property of history, 
whereas collective memory is laden with mythical, fabricated and distorted 
elements. It aims to demonstrate how truth and meaning are accomplished 
in vernacular rhetoric, and what kind of truth the participants want to be 
associated with. As Sturken acknowledges, “the debate over truth and fal-
sity is irresolvable”; instead of ascribing falsehood, narratives should be 
examined for the fears and desires they express. 
The following excerpts of Serb and Albanian vernacular narratives are 
taken from a larger corpus of  ethnographic interviews that I collected 
in Kosovo, from June to August . They are a purposive sample, chosen 
for the brevity and coherence of the narratives, and because they are repre-
sentative of the vernacular rhetoric of Kosovo Serbs and Albanians in the 
larger corpus. While this ideological criticism uses selected passages, these 
may be considered characteristic fragments of larger historical victimage 
narratives in Kosovo. I view these selections as representative because the 
 Sturken, Tangled memories,  (emphasis in original).
 Tamar Katriel, “Sites of memory: Discourses of the past in Israeli pioneering settle-
ment museums”, Quarterly Journal of Speech , no. (), -, -. 
 Clark and McKerrow, “Rhetorical construction of history”; Gronbeck, “Rhetorics of 
the past”; Sturken, Tangled memories. 
 Laine Berman, “Surviving on the streets of Java: homeless children’s narratives of 
violence”, Discourse & Society , no.  (), -.
 Sturken, “Remembering of forgetting”, .
 I realize that this claim invites criticisms of ignoring multiple voices, perspectives, 
identiﬁcations, and the existence of various vernacular memories, but in the interest of 
space and brevity I could not include them.Balcanica XXXVI 92
participants identiﬁed themselves and spoke as members of their respective 
ethnic and national groups, expressing oﬃcial national history and Kosovo’s 
collective memory. 
I suggest that the narratives in the following section arise out of a 
daily repetition or rehearsal of “our version of events”. This is a crucial dis-
cursive practice, “because the habitus has to be painstakingly reinforced in 
the face of life-worlds that are frequently in ﬂux”, and quite literary so 
in an area like Kosovo. The everyday discourse about suﬀering can thus be 
regarded as a commemoration ritual, or as Burke has termed it a “victi-
mage ritual”, which serves not only to express and release trauma, but to 
crystallize, reconﬁrm and solidify it. This vernacular discourse is imperative 
because it becomes the place, or as Kenny suggests milieu, where victim-
ization is reposited – the place where telling about victimization not only 
makes it vivid, present and meaningful, but also where it becomes larger 
than life; indeed it becomes historical. Burke’s concept of victimage rhetoric 
posits that such narratives are necessarily melodramatic. They serve to instil 
hatred and fear of the Other, justify violent actions, because the desire that 
arises out of the narratives ultimately aims, as Blain says, “to destroy the 
destroyer”, either physically or symbolically. The melodramatic aspect of 
the victimage rhetoric in these narratives is exempliﬁed in the claim to the 
absolute historical victim status and the use of great national tragedies to 
support this. The national tragedies are incredibly complex ideological con-
ﬁgurations, and are very often associated with the notion of moral victory.
The narratives of suﬀering exemplify the amalgamation of personal 
and collective memories with oﬃcial national histories. Personal memory 
becomes collectivized and collective memory is instantiated through auto-
biographical recollection, which is further reinforced through oﬃcial dis-
courses. The polysemic nature of memorializing works additively, bring-
ing together both particular and universal memories. Thus, the participants 
mirror to a certain extent the oﬃcial history, but do not reproduce it exactly; 
rather they appropriate and embellish it, making it contemporary and per-
sonal. Accordingly, the victimage rhetoric of these narratives is not mono-
 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at large (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
), .
 Kenneth Burke, A rhetoric of motives (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 
).
 M.G. Kenny, “A place for memory: The interface between individual and collective 
history”, Comparative Studies in Society and History , no.  (), -.
 M. Blain, “Rhetorical practice in an anti-nuclear weapons campaign”, Peace & Change 
, no.  (), -, .
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lithic, but can be viewed as combining three diﬀerent levels: the personal or 
familial, the regional or Kosovar, and the national, i.e. Serb and Albanian. 
It is important to explain here the signiﬁcance of regional collective 
memories, because the vernacular narratives in this study make use of col-
lective memories speciﬁc to Kosovo, which Serbs and Albanians from other 
regions do not necessarily know or share in. The variation is not only due 
to divergent historical experiences, but also because collective memories, as 
notably narratives of who we are and who we were, are not just about our-
selves, but necessarily include the “Other”. These memories are thus region-
ally diﬀerent, because the Other is not necessarily the same for the entire 
national group. The ﬂow of history forms and re-forms groups and brings 
them into contact with a shifting range of signiﬁcant Others. Thus regional, 
as well as other, variations are signiﬁcant.
In Kosovo, as Valtchinova and Kostovicova suggest, the Albanian 
national identity was, and is, clearly delineated in opposition to the Serbs as 
the ethnic Other. On the other hand, for Albanians living in the southern 
part of Albania, the others are both the Greeks and the northern Albanian 
Ghegs. Likewise, for Serbs living in Bosnia, the others are Croats and 
Bosnian Muslims – Bosniaks, while the Serbs living in Kosovo have con-
stituted their identity in opposition to the Albanians. As there is no unitary, 
national identity that is identical and variationless across groups, so there 
 For example, for the urban Belgrade class the Others during the Bosnian war were not 
the Bosnian Muslims or the Croats, but rather the Bosnian Serb refugees, in relation 
to whom the Belgrade population diﬀerentiated themselves. Before that, the people of 
Belgrade constructed their identity in opposition to the rural population. This is just one 
example, but there are many, since identiﬁcations are multiple and ﬂuid, and the Other 
anchoring them is likewise variable.
 Some examples are discussed in V. Y. Mudimbe, Nations, identities and cultures (Dur-
ham: Duke University Press, ).
 Galia Valtchinova, “Ismail Kadare’s The H-File and the making of the Homeric verse: 
Variations on the works and lives of Milman Parry and Albert Lord”, in Stephanie 
Schwadner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, eds., Albanian identities: Myth and history
(London: Hurst & Company, ). 
 Denisa Kostovicova, “‘Shkolla Shqipe’ and nationhood: Albanians in pursuit of educa-
tion in the native language in interwar (-) and post-autonomy (-) Ko-
sovo”, in Stephanie Schwadner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, eds., Albanian identities: 
Myth and history, (London: Hurst & Company, ).
 Gilles de Rapper, “Culture and the reinvention of myths in a border area”, in Steph-
anie Schwadner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, eds., Albanian identities: Myth and history 
(London: Hurst & Company, ).
 Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian way (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
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is no single Other. And as identiﬁcations and their anchoring Others are 
diverse, so are collective memories. Therefore, the narratives in this study are 
not representative of Serb and Albanian arguments in general, but of the 
Kosovo Serb and Albanian claims.
Fears and desires in competing narratives of historical victimage
In the following excerpts participants express their fear of the Other and a 
desire for symbolic or physical annihilation through constructing compet-
ing and oppositional narratives of historical victimage. All the, sometimes 
real and sometimes imagined, injustices and troubles are blamed on the 
Other. Duijzings remarks that the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, as oth-
er groups in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the world, each have their 
own catalogue of victims, atrocities, destruction and endured injustices, al-
though not capacity to admit and grieve for the hurts of others. And Silber 
and Little explain: 
To work in former Yugoslavia is to enter a world of parallel truths. 
Wherever you go, you encounter the same resolute conviction that 
everything that had befallen the region is always someone else’s fault, 
except one’s own side … Each nation has embraced a separate ortho-
doxy in which it is uniquely the victim and never the perpetrator.
The narratives in this study embody this rigidity, as they are accounts of 
total and absolute historical oppression. 
Because this ideological study looks at vernacular memory, it is not 
concerned with determining the veracity of claims, or reproducing previous 
work on the former Yugoslavia. I will not try to give an “objective” historical 
account for the reader, but will allow for the multivocality of Kosovo Serb 
and Albanian voices in the following analysis. 
In the ﬁrst subsection of this second segment I present the narra-
tive of an Albanian interviewee, and in the second subsection a dialogue 
between two Serb speakers. I have not included their names, not only for 
conﬁdentiality purposes, but also because the participants are speaking here 
not only as individuals, but as members of their respective ethnic groups. 
They are therefore identiﬁed as such. 
Victimization of the Albanians as an historical injustice
In the following excerpt the speaker summarizes, using very strong lan-
guage, the main points of the general and oﬃcial Albanian argument of 
 Ger Duijzings, Religion and the politics of identity in Kosovo (London: Hurst, ). 
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centuries-long oppression. He emphasizes that there are two sources from 
which he draws his claims, and those are personal experience and what he 
calls history. Albanian history for him is the oﬃcially ratiﬁed version of 
events, which connotes and implies legitimacy and authenticity. 
Albanian speaker:
The Albanians have always been humiliated, oppressed, victimized 
and discriminated against. I mean everyone has direct experience 
with that. And then there’s history. Our history teaches us that, too. 
The Serbs have always been our enemies. They are aggressive, and 
you can’t trust them. They always, throughout the centuries, they 
always hated us. They colonized Kosovo, and they oppressed us. They 
have been oppressing us for centuries. I know that for a fact. I know 
it both from my experience and from our history.
In support of his claim, the speaker then continues to give speciﬁc examples. 
He refers to the victimization of Albanians as common knowledge, when he 
says “we all know, everyone knows”.
We know what the četniks did to us during World War II, and before 
that. They killed and burned and looted. Nothing was left. And then 
after the war, we all know, everyone knows what Rankovic did. His 
policy was to kill as many Albanians as he can, and more than that. 
 See I. Berisha, Serbian colonization and ethnic cleansing of Kosova: Documents and evi-
dence (Pristina, ); Isa Blumi, “The role of education in the formation of Albanian 
identity and its myths”, in Stephanie Schwadner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, eds., Al-
banian identities: Myth and history (London: Hurst & Company, ); Nicolas J. Costa, 
Albania: A European enigma (Boulder, CO: Eastern European Monographs, ); 
Kristo Frasheri, The history of Albania: A brief survey (Tirana, ); Hasan Kaleši, “Ko-
sovo pod turskom vlascu” [Kosovo under Turkish rule], in M. Maletić, ed., Kosovo nekad 
i sad (Kosova dikur e sot) [Kosovo once and now], (Belgrade: Plato, ); M. Krasniqi, 
“The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in anti-Albanian policies in Kosova”, in 
J. Bajraktari, ed., The Kosova issue – A historic and current problem (Tirana, ); An-
ton Logoreci, “A clash between two nationalisms in Kosova”, in Arshi Pipa & Sami 
Repishti, eds., Studies on Kosova (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, ); 
Shkelzen Maliqi, Kosova: Separate worlds, reﬂections and analyses - (Pristina, 
); Sami Repishti, “The evolution of Kosova’s autonomy within the Yugoslav consti-
tutional framework”, in Arshi Pipa & Sami Repishti, eds., Studies on Kosova (Boulder, 
CO: East European Monographs, ); Stavro Skendi, Albania (Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press, ); Stavro Skendi. The Albanian national awakening, -
 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ).
 These were monarchists who were loyal to the exiled King Peter, and who fought 
against the Nazi occupiers. Because the Albanians joined the Nazis in World War II, 
these troops fought against them. It is derived from četa, a term used for the guerilla 
groups who fought against the Turkish empire in the th and beginning of the th 
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The selective memories that he is invoking are not very detailed, and are 
considered to be tacit knowledge, in no need of further explication. Yet, they 
are the most politically volatile. The name četniks, even though it is not of re-
cent origin, was used during the s Yugoslav wars, both by radical Serbs 
to characterize themselves in a heroic light, as the keepers of the Serbian 
nationalist tradition, and by other groups to label their brutal and primitive 
behaviour. Therefore, while for the Serbs, the word četnikis positive, because 
its reminds of Serbian opposition to Nazism, for other ethnic groups in 
the former Yugoslavia it is very negative, and has strong connotations of 
irrational, aggressive and even genocidal behaviour. Similarly, the Albanian 
speaker mentions Ranković, the hated head of UDB (the secret police), in-
terior minister (until ) and vice-president, until , accusing him of 
conducting a campaign of extermination. He is cast as a Hitler-like ﬁgure, 
and he comes to embody the Serb people and their intentions throughout 
the centuries.
The speaker then continues to maintain that the Albanians were not 
victimized only during the Milošević period, and asserts that Serbs and Al-
banians had never lived together peacefully and had never liked each other. 
He gives a brief disclaimer though, saying that there were some individual 
exemptions, although he points out that they were not very common. Such 
narratives tap into what both Serb and Albanian oﬃcial histories say, but 
they also acknowledge the polysemic vernacular memories. Most of the 
participants in the larger study, Serb and Albanian, avow that while group 
relations were never amicable or peaceful, there were individual interactions 
that were. However, they are careful to stress that these are exceptions. 
I mean, so it’s not just the Milošević period. No, no. Before that, 
long before that. For a long time, a very long time. I mean, I think I 
can say that the only golden years for the Albanians in Kosovo were 
maybe between  and . Maybe. That’s when the local Serbs sup-
posedly felt that the Albanians got more rights and more privileges, 
but everything else, I mean people feel and remember only bad 
 However, Ranković imprisoned people and conducted secret investigations to pre-
vent ‘counter-revolutionaries’ and ‘Albanian irredentists’ from operating in Yugoslavia, 
as Albania at that time was strictly aligned with the Soviet bloc. Ranković’s measures 
were as much directed against and felt by Serbs and other groups in Yugoslavia, as the 
Albanians. The years after the war in Yugoslavia were marked by frequent and brutal 
purges within the Communist Party and its leadership, so that all groups were equally 
the victims of a paranoid and dictatorial regime, which aimed to pacify all its subjects. 
The speaker’s claim is representative of the collective memory of Albanians, who claim 
that after Tito ﬁred Ranković they started getting their freedom (Judah, Kosovo).
 Milan Šuﬂaj, Srbi i Arbanasi: njihova simbioza u srednjem vijeku [Serbs and Arbanas: 
Their symbiosis in the Middle Ages], (Sarajevo: Književna zajednica Kultura, ).H. Zdravković, Vernacular Discourses of Historical Victimage 97
things, only bad memories. There are some people who talk about 
friendships and mixed marriages, but it wasn’t like in Bosnia, or 
other republics. Here, no, I mean the distance was always very big, 
very big, because there was always so much injustice. Always. For 
centuries the Serbs oppressed us as the colonizers, as the occupiers 
of Kosovo. They even changed our names and tried to convert us. I 
mean, that’s how it was. The Serbs weren’t the oppressed raya in 
the Turkish empire. Don’t believe that. Don’t believe anything they 
say, because Serbian history is a big lie. Our folk poetry says that the 
Serbs occupied Kosovo, that they were always the aggressors, the evil 
people. Kosovo is Albanian land. I mean, Albania was recognized 
only in  as an independent state, but Kosovo always had a ma-
jority Albanian population. Always. And the Serbs always oppressed 
them, subjugated and exploited them. We remember everything the 
Serbs did to us, through the centuries, in this century, in this recent 
period. Everything. 
The speaker contends, as he did before, that the Serbs always hated the 
Albanians. On the other hand, he does not say that the Albanians hated the 
Serbs, but simply that there was a very big distance, for which the cause was 
the “injustice” done to the Albanians. He then progresses further along the 
timeline, going back centuries and repeating his main argument about Ser-
bian colonizers and occupiers of Kosovo, which he derives from Albanian 
history books. 
The speaker counters the standard Serb claim of victimization by the 
Ottomans and the Albanians, and accuses Serbian history of being “a big 
lie”. He thus tells a polarizing and totalizing victimage narrative, without 
the possibility of even partial truth or validity to Serbian claims of vic-
timization. He is implicitly disputing not only Serbian historiography, but 
general historiography about the Ottoman empire and the conditions of 
Christians within it. He allows only for singular suﬀering, wherein he 
relies, as he says, on national history, folk poetry, and both collective and 
personal memories. He says “people feel and remember only bad things, 
only bad memories”, which is exemplary of what Nietzsche has pointed 
out as one of the primary characteristics of victimage. 
 Turkish word signifying ordinary people. The raya were a speciﬁc class in the Otto-
man empire, which was Christian and had to work for the wealthy Muslim landowners, 
spahis. 
 For examples see Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A short history (New York: The Modern 
Library, ). Georgije Ostrogorsky. History of the Byzantine state (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, ); Leften S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since  (New 
York: New York University Press, ). 
 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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Invoking the Other’s history in order to refute it is a strategy that almost all 
participants in the larger study use. It is meant to point out inconsistencies 
and falsities in the Other’s history and argument. Participants thus engage 
the Other in an imagined dialogue, and directly dispute the opposing ver-
sion of events. Bakhtin calls this the dialogizing of another’s discourse, 
wherein the speaker dialogues between his own position and the position 
of others.
The Albanians speaker in this excerpt invokes collective memory in 
the form of folk poetry to corroborate his accusation against Serbian vic-
timage, and refers to the memory of the people several times. He portrays 
it as the memory of constant, perpetual and centuries-long oppression, as 
well as of the denial, by the Serbs, of their tyranny. It is exemplary as being 
an invented tradition, which is part of the enduring memory that I men-
tioned earlier. 
To provide a solid historical basis for his assertions, the speaker goes 
further back in time, to give the story of origin, as it is postulated by oﬃcial 
Albanian historiography. The myth of origin and primordial claims to terri-
torial possession are vital to all nations and their endeavours, but in Kosovo 
they are especially relevant, contested and explosive, because both groups 
claims to be the ﬁrst settlers and therefore the rightful owners of the land. 
The questions “who came ﬁrst” and “who is the guest of whom” ﬁgure quite 
prominently in both oﬃcial and vernacular discourse. As Ramet points out, 
the Kosovo debate is much like the Israeli-Palestinian issue: “Two ethnic 
communities with distinct languages and religious traditions lay claims to 
the same territory with competing historical arguments as evidence.”
Burke’s notion of the melodramatic is especially exempliﬁed in the 
Albanian speaker’s claim that the history of the Albanian people has been 
one of constant struggle for freedom and liberty. In the next excerpt, he says 
“you see, from the very early history of our people, we have always been un-
der attack”. This notion of being attacked and under threat exempliﬁes the 
fear that motivates historical victimage narratives, and is intimately tied to 
the innocence of the victim who suﬀers unjustly. It invokes martyrdom and 
noble sacriﬁce for the nation. 
The Albanians are the oldest people in the Balkans. That’s the truth. 
Our ancestors are the Illyrians, and we are older even than the 
Greeks. I mean, some famous people, like Aristotle, weren’t Greek at 
 Mikhail Bakhtin, The dialogic imagination: Four essays (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, ).
 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The invention of tradition (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, ).
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all. They were Albanian. Then the Romans came and colonized us. 
Then the Slavs attacked us and they colonized us. You see, from the 
very early history of our people, we have always been under attack. 
All this was once ours, the whole region. Albania, Kosovo, parts of 
Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, and also some parts of Bulgaria. I 
mean, the whole Balkan region was Albanian before all these others 
came and conquered us. We have archaeological sites to prove it, and 
our language is living proof. Our language is the oldest. It’s ancient. 
So we have all the rights to Kosovo, as Illyrians and as the majority 
that has always been oppressed. 
The speaker argues that Albanians have rights to the land because they are 
the ﬁrst to inhabit it, and also because they have been the victims for so 
many centuries. The Serbs are not only cast as ancient villains, but are also 
charged with ‘stealing’ the Albanian territory. There is a lot of repetition in 
the speaker’s narrative; “always” is repeated thirteen times in his narrative. 
It emphasizes the constancy of the victim/villain dichotomy and serves to 
ﬁrmly establish the veracity of the speaker’s claims.
The Albanian speaker’s narrative presents an internally coherent and 
persuasive argument about the unjust historical victimization of the Al-
banian people. It is constructed through powerful and selective stories of 
oppression, derived from personal and collective memory, and reinforced 
through appealing to oﬃcial national history. It is important to note how-
ever that while oﬃcial national history provides facts and legitimacy to the 
personal and the collective, the relationship is reﬂexive. The speaker’s narra-
tive is a testimony to the veracity of the national history and the dominant 
narrative, and how it ﬁgures in vernacular rhetoric.
“History is repeating itself for the Serbs”
In this subsection, the two Serb dialogue partners, relate their immediate 
suﬀering to such instances in the past, and claim that historically it has 
always been this way for Serbs in Kosovo. They expound on their current 
oppression in detail, but I have decided not to include that part of their 
dialogue here for the purposes of brevity; the excerpt chosen speaks directly 
about historical victimage, which is the focus of this ideological study. In 
the larger study, all Serb participants invariably follow the same line of ar-
gumentation, describing in detail their present situation and then linking it 
to a larger historical context of Serb-Albanian relations. Therein they com-
press several centuries into the claim that the Serbs have continually been 
oppressed, thus elevating their status to eternal victims as opposed to the 
perpetual Albanian aggressors. The speakers in this dialogue maintain that 
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“history is repeating itself” in terms of the oppressor-oppressed relationship 
and the Serbs’ contemporary predicament. The past is used not only to make 
sense of the present, but also to reinforce victimization claims. 
Serb speaker :
You know, it has always been this way. During the Turks, they [Al-
banians] killed our men and raped our women, then the same hap-
pened when the Germans and Italians came, in both world wars, 
and even during Tito, there were so many incidents of kidnapping, 
killing, and raping, just like today. But everything got covered up, 
just like now. You know, they always hated Serbs. Always wanted 
just to kill us all.
The speaker summarizes the main points of the Serb argument, which 
maintains that the Albanians have always been the villains, while the Serbs 
have always been the victims. He repeats the same claim that the Albanian 
makes, namely that of the Other always hating the in-group. He then uses 
a personal, or rather familial memory to back up his claim. 
Speaker :
You know, for instance, they killed my great grandfather while he 
was working in his ﬁeld. The Shiptars [Albanians] slaughtered 
him. And then, later, you know a Shiptar came to take weapons and 
food and money from my grandfather one day, but my grandfather 
wouldn’t give him anything and he threw him out. But then his 
brothers, who knew what this Shiptar was capable of doing, they ran 
after him and gave him what he wanted and pleaded with him to 
spare my grandfather because of his wife and children. They pleaded 
with him for a long time, and they barely saved him. But we remem-
ber all that. We know who our great grandfathers and grandfathers 
were, what it was like then, what they did and how they suﬀered. We 
know all that. 
The speaker’s choice of words, such as “slaughtered”, in contrast to “plead-
ed” paints a vivid image of the aggressor/innocence dichotomy. Speaking 
 Shiptars is a word that Serbs use to refer to Albanians. It is now a pejorative term, 
derived from the Albanian name for themselves Shqiptars. This term was widely used 
before , and did not have negative connotations. After  though, when the 
Serbs in Kosovo started feeling threatened, the term acquired derogatory and negative 
connotations. The Albanians associate the term and its usage with the rise of Serbian 
nationalism and subsequent violence, considering it a mark of disrespect and denigra-
tion. However, I interviewed several Albanians, mostly those living in Serbia proper, 
who did not like being called Albanian, but requested to be called Shiptars. One in-
terviewee said: “I am not Albanian. Pu, pu, pu [spitting]. No way. Albanians are from 
Albania. I am from Kosovo – I am Shiptar.” Likewise, there are some Serbs who do not 
use the term with negative or derogatory intentions, but use it out of habit. As one Serb 
interviewee in Kosovo said: “They [Albanians] are Shiptars for us, and they will always 
be Shiptars for us. Albanians are in Albania. Shiptars are ours.”H. Zdravković, Vernacular Discourses of Historical Victimage 101
about his great grandfather and grandfather as victims of Albanian terror 
is likewise most powerful because in Kosovo, as in the rest of the Balkans 
and many other areas around the world, grandfathers are revered elders and 
patriarchs. They are considered the embodiments and containers of national 
wisdom, courage and honour. They are the guardians of the national spirit 
and its memories. Therefore, metaphorically, by killing elders, such as the 
speaker’s great grandfather and grandfather, the Albanians are thought to 
be killing the Serbian identity and collective memory. However, the speak-
er demonstrates how memories are kept alive, despite such attempts; he 
says “but we remember all that”, asserting that collective memory is alive 
and well and does not forget such injustice. He is not speciﬁc in what it is 
that people remember, because it is implied that every Serb in Kosovo has 
similar family stories, and shares the same memories. This suggests that 
the ideas Serb speaker  espouses are not idiosyncratic, but are much more 
complex ideological conﬁgurations. His partner in dialogue uses this “exem-
plary” incident to paint a wider historical picture and emphasize the pattern 
of victimization. The speakers together construct, what is for them, a strong, 
coherent and logical argument. They amplify and conﬁrm each other’s argu-
ments. 
Serb speaker : 
In every war they went about creating a Greater Albania. When the 
Turk came, they accepted Islam, so the Serbs were the subjugated 
raya. Under the zulum of their mercenaries and zulumćari Serbs 
were forced either to suﬀer or to leave. Then in  when we took 
back Kosovo we accepted all those mercenaries and zulumćari, and 
we didn’t treat them like second-class citizens, but wanted to help 
them, because we knew what pain, misery and suﬀering were like. 
But because they never felt those things, they never knew torture 
and suﬀering, they didn’t know how to appreciate that, just like today 
they don’t know how to appreciate everything that Yugoslavia has 
given them. They constantly think that they have to torture someone. 
He argues that the Albanians have always sided with the conquerors, and 
have always taken advantage of their privileged position to destroy Serbs and 
their claims to the land. On the other hand, like the Albanian speaker before 
him, and many other participants in the larger study, he does not mention 
some of the reciprocity in this process, but contends that after Kosovo was 
won back in  the Serbs were merciful toward the Albanians, because 
they understood what being victimized means. The dichotomy is between 
the compassionate Serbs and the ruthless Albanians, who “constantly think 
 This is a Turkish word, which signiﬁes intense, unbridled, unrestrained violence and 
brutality; it has similar connotations as today ‘ethnic cleansing’ does. 
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that they have to torture someone”. The speaker gives speciﬁc historical in-
stances when this was especially prominent further on.
Speaker : 
During the First World War when Serbia was attacked by Austro-
Hungarians, Germans and Bulgarians, they used our weak state to 
kill more of us and chase us away from our homes. The same dur-
ing the Second World War. They created Greater Albania, they had 
their SS unit, Skanderbeg, and they killed so many of us, and expelled 
everyone. And then the worst enemy of the Serbs, Tito, didn’t allow 
people to come back.
The speaker selectively invokes memories, including and leaving out memo-
ries according to their usefulness in constructing a coherent and positive ar-
gument about his group. This does not allow for the inclusion of competing 
or divergent memories, such as those that come from the historiography or 
the collective memory of the Other. The process of glossing over memories 
that speak negatively of the in-group, and supplanting them with positive 
ones, is exemplary of the process, inherent to creating histories and collec-
tive memories, of selective remembering and forgetting.
Obviously, this is not typical only in the Balkans. Bruner shows how 
in Russia and Quebec national identities were (re)created through selec-
tive erasure. In West Germany though, the strategy did not call only for 
a “simple” erasure of National Socialist perpetrators from public memory, 
but also needed West Germans to identify themselves as victims of Na-
tional Socialism. Dealing with the same issue, Hughes explains that such 
a construction was not a matter of “simply ignoring vast stretches of the 
past”, because that would “leave an unsustainable vacuum”, while “resorting 
to obvious untruths [would open] one’s claims to easy refutation”. Instead 
inconvenient facts were silently passed over, while useful truths and half-
truths were highlighted. 
Zerubavel regards such a dynamic as a conscious and deliberate sup-
pression of unfavourable stories about the past; White explains it as “rep-
 R. S. Esbenshade, “Remembering to forget: Memory, history, national identity in 
postwar East-Central Europe”, Representations  (), -; Ernest Renan, Qu’est-
ce qu’une nation? [What is a nation?], in Oeuvres Completes [Complete Works], (Paris: 
Calmann-Levy, -), -. 
 Michael L. Bruner, Strategies of Remembrance: The Rhetorical Dimensions of National 
Identity Construction (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 
). 
 Michael L. Hughes, “ ‘Through no fault of their own’: West Germans remember their 
war losses”, German History , no.  (), . 
 Yael Zerubavel, Recovered roots: Collective memory and the making of Israeli national 
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resentation” and “repression”, while Hasian and Frank view it as a matter 
of debate, recirculation and renegotiation. An example that illustrates this 
dynamic is Milošević’s rise to power. Milošević “tapped into” and raised to 
the oﬃcial level, previously repressed collective memories of the Kosovo 
Serbs and their latent antagonism and resentment toward the Albanians.
In former Yugoslavia, especially under Tito’s rule, vernacular memories of 
ethnic hatred and strife were not allowed to circulate, because under the 
oﬃcial banner of communist Yugoslavia, “brotherhood and unity” prevailed 
over ethnic discord. This did not mean that vernacular memories were for-
gotten. Ratifying some memories as oﬃcial, Milosevic acquired a solid elec-
toral support for claiming power. This move on his part is most often cited 
as the most powerful impetus to the subsequent Yugoslav wars. 
One of the memories that had previously been repressed, but has 
since the s been recirculated and renegotiated is that of the prohibi-
tion Tito put on Kosovo Serbs, who were exiled during World War II, to 
return to their land. This is an event that is speciﬁc to Kosovo. Therefore, 
while many other Serbs might agree with the speaker in his characteriza-
tion of Tito as the “the worst enemy of the Serbs”, they might not share 
the same vernacular memories that are the basis for this speaker claiming 
so. The Serbs in Kosovo always resented Tito for giving the Albanians too 
much power and too many privileges, so that this regional memory arises 
out of a diﬀerent experience than the one other Serbs in former Yugoslavia 
have. 
However, the Serbian speakers also evoke the oﬃcial historical ver-
sion of World War II, one that has been legitimized by the rest of the world, 
by remembering the Albanian-Italian-German alliance, and the atrocities 
the Albanians committed as Nazi ﬁghters. The Albanians are thus placed on 
a par with the Nazis, which is the most vivid and powerful image of a villain. 
This is a common and rhetorically eﬀective strategy for creating authorita-
tive victimage narratives, not only in the discourse of Serbs and Albanians 
in Kosovo, but many others around the world. Moeller suggests that various 
 H. V. White, “Foucault decoded: Notes from underground”, History and Theory 
(), -, .
 Marouf Hasian, Jr., and Robert E. Frank, “Rhetoric, history, and collective memory: 
Decoding the Goldhagen debates”, Western Journal of Communication , no.  (), 
-. 
 Carl-Ulrich Schierup, “The post-communist enigma: Ethnic mobilization in Yugo-
slavia”, New Community , no.  ().
 Bogdanović, Knjiga o Kosovu; Krstić, Kosovo.
 Janice H. Rushing and Thomas S. Frentz, “The Gods must be crazy: The denial of 
descent in academic scholarship”, Quarterly Journal of Speech , no.  (), -.Balcanica XXXVI 104
groups use the Jewish experience to construct their own victim identities;
it is very functional, because, as Doerr explains, the “Jewish genocide pro-
vides metaphorical language and a framework to express absolute domina-
tion, victimization, and unbearable suﬀering”.
Thus, Holocaust imagery ﬁgures prominently in the vernacular dis-
course of both Serbs and Albanians. We have seen how the Albanian com-
pares Rankovic to Hitler, and portrays scenes of ethnic cleansing and geno-
cide. Likewise, the Serbs use the same tactic, because it is one of the most 
eﬀective ways of immediately delineating between the victims and the vil-
lains. Building on the momentum, the ﬁrst speaker immediately reinforces 
this image of the suﬀering Serb nation. He exempliﬁes Burke’s melodra-
matic aspect of victimage, by using the word stradalnici, which translates lit-
erally as “universal historical suﬀerers”. It connotes suﬀering of historic and 
heroic proportions, and is only used in an epic context. The word merges 
martyrdom with innocence and injustice in historically transcendent suf-
fering.
Speaker : 
In each war, and we’ve had too many of them, we were the great-
est stradalnici and the most ardent ﬁghters for freedom. In every 
war the Serbs suﬀered the most. In World War II, every third Serb 
was killed. Houses, families destroyed, the intelligentsia murdered, 
the raya was left only to work. Serbia is small, but she has given the 
most lives and victims for the freedom of Yugoslavia, and the rest of 
the world. I don’t know of another nation that has suﬀered so much 
and forgiven so much. After  and the Kosovo Battle, the Serbs 
have continually been suﬀering, forced to abandon their ethnic 
space, where the ﬁrst royal thrones were, at Prizren and Novo Brdo, 
where their spiritual and cultural heart started beating. I mean, since 
that battle, we have just been going downhill. 
The melodramatic is further strengthened through the speakers “poetic” 
words about Kosovo and the ancient royal thrones of Serbian kings, as the 
places where the Serbian “spiritual and cultural heart started beating”. The 
speaker refers to the pivotal element of Serbian victimage, memorialized 
through Serbian historiography, epic poetry, and national collective memo-
ry – the famous Battle of Kosovo (). This battle is engraved into what 
Durkheim calls the “conscience collective”, in this case of the Serbian people, 
like the Jewish Masada, and is considered a “turning point”, because ﬁve 
 Robert G. Moeller, War stories: The search for a usable past in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Berkley: University of California Press, ).
 K. Doerr, “Memories of history: Women and the Holocaust in autobiographical and 
ﬁctional memoirs”, Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies , no.  (), 
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centuries of subjugation under Ottoman rule follow it. The battle is the 
foundational nationalist claim, and its political, symbolic and emotional sig-
niﬁcance has been analyzed or at the very least mentioned in, to my knowl-
edge, almost every work that has been written about the Serbs.
For reasons of space I will not go into detail about this battle, but it 
is important to note that it embodies and symbolizes the Serbian spirit of 
ﬁghting for Christianity against the “Turkish inﬁdels”, dying for freedom 
and spilling their blood for their sacred land. Therefore, the appeal to this 
battle not only uses oﬃcial Serbian historiography, but it calls on the vast 
repository of national collective memory to create the contrast between the 
heroic Serbs and their sad history, with that of the Albanians, who “never 
stood up to anyone”. The disparity here is not simply between the victim 
and the villain, but between a people who ﬁght for their freedom and prin-
ciples, and a people who don’t have morals and who prefer the easy way out, 
as Serb speaker  elaborates further. 
Speaker :
In each war they never stood up to anyone. They always sided with 
the strongest and most ruthless – the Turks, Italians, Nazis. History 
is the same, only the victor changes. When the Turks ruled, they 
were with the Turks, then the Austro-Hungarians, the Italians, the 
Germans, now the Americans, and when they leave, they’ll ﬁnd 
someone else.
Speaker :
No change whatsoever – everything that was happening then, is 
happening now. Everything that was before is going on today. That 
is really a quagmire. I often read a letter that Father Sava sent to the 
Berlin Congress in . The same thing is happening today. The 
things that were going on then … Father Sava was the oﬃcial rep-
resentative of the Serbian people in Kosovo, and he wrote a letter to 
the ambassadors of the Great Powers at the Berlin Congress. Then, 
and now, there is no diﬀerence for us Serbs – we are being killed, 
kidnapped, molested, our churches and monasteries destroyed, there 
is no life here, as there was none then. 
 Lynda E. Boose, “Crossing the river Drina: Bosnian rape camps, Turkish impalement, 
and Serb cultural memory”, Signs, no.  (), -; Thomas A. Emmert, “Kosovo: 
Development and impact of a national ethic”, in Ivo Banac, John G. Ackerman and Ro-
man Szporluk. eds., Nation and ideology: Essays in honor of Wayne S. Vucinich (Boulder, 
CO: East European Monographs, ); Thomas A. Emmert, Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo 
 (New York: New York University Press, ); Robert G. D. Laﬀan, The Serbs: The 
guardians of the gate (New York: Dorset Press, ); Olga Zirojevic, “Kosovo in the col-
lective memory”, in Nebojsa Popov, ed., The road to war in Serbia: Trauma and catharsis
(Budapest: Central European University Press, ).Balcanica XXXVI 106
The speakers here refer to, and cite as proof of oppression, the letter to the 
Congress of Berlin (), which is another vernacular memory speciﬁc to 
Kosovo. The letter has been reprinted and I have seen it circulated through 
and read in the remaining Serb houses in Kosovo.
Speaker : 
When you read that letter then you really understand that every-
thing is the same, the powers at play, the events, everything is the 
same. Some of the actors have changed, but the stage is the same, 
and the plot is the same. Everything is the same. Even though 
Kosovo is ours, we have to suﬀer. 
The dominant notion that history is repeating itself is most clearly expressed 
by Serb speaker , who says “history is he same, only the victor changes”, 
and then later, “some of the actors have changed, but the stage is the same, 
and the plot is the same”. 
The vernacular discourses in this section illustrate how the rhetoric of 
victimage as melodramatic is accomplished by integrating personal and col-
lective memories with oﬃcially ratiﬁed history, wherein each is invoked and 
used in support of the other. There is true interdependence of these parts, 
and the boundaries between them are not clear-cut, but overlap and inter-
mix, in creating for these participants coherent, well-supported and rational 
arguments about the historical victimage of their respective group. 
While the preceding analysis has been mostly descriptive in illustrat-
ing how victimage narratives are constructed through vernacular discourse, 
the next segment deals with the signiﬁcance and the functions of claiming 
historical victimage for the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. 
The signiﬁcance and the functions of historical victimage narratives in Kosovo
It would be a mistake to think that the process of constructing and validat-
ing one’s victim identity, and hence the Other’s villain identity, is speciﬁc 
only to war zones, because stories of victimization are vital for creating co-
hesive national communities. Amato explains that victimage is at the core 
of national, social or indeed individual identity, saying that “if we have no 
suﬀerings or sacriﬁces to call our own, we have no story to tell, and with 
no story to tell, we are no people at all”. Anderson emphasizes the crucial 
need for victimization to create a nationally cohesive history when he says 
that “the nation’s biography snatches, against the going mortality rate, ex-
emplary suicides, poignant martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars, and 
 Joseph A. Amato, Victims and values: A history and a theory of suﬀering (New York: 
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holocausts. But, to serve the narrative purpose, these violent deaths must be 
remembered/forgotten as ‘our own’ .” Similarly, Osborne says that 
for reasons which seem obscure to us, collective memory on a na-
tional level loves to dwell on negative experiences. In particular, 
the notion of victim, victimhood and victimization plays a crucial 
role in the collective memory of virtually every country. Stronger in 
some than in others, diﬀering in its intensity according to time and 
space, every country seems to have had at least one trauma in its past 
which continues to haunt its collective memory.
However, I disagree with Osborne’s claim that the reasons for why victim 
identity is so endemic to every society are always obscure, because my re-
search seems to indicate that they are in certain cases transparent, and can be 
instrumental for several purposes. After reviewing the above narratives one 
can content that claiming historical suﬀering provides moral high ground, 
garners sympathy and can serve as justiﬁcation and exculpation, while be-
ing cast as the perpetrator invokes guilt, culpability and most importantly, 
punishment. The primary means through which this is achieved is through 
invoking collective memories and histories, as these are a key attribute of 
identity and are ideologically constrained by the Us as victims versus Them 
as villains opposition.
In order to unpack some of the functions of the competing historical 
victimage narratives, it is necessary to move beyond mere discovery, and the-
orize about the practical and pragmatic aspects of this vernacular rhetoric. 
The three functions that will be examined in this section are: using the past 
to make sense of the present, denying the Other, and justifying violence. 
First function of historical victimage: Making sense of the present
As Zelizer says “the past compels us for what it tells us about the present”.
The participants construct symbolically their victim identity through using 
the past to make sense of their contemporary situation. They situate their 
personal and collective trauma within a broader context, and do not see it 
as novel, but as a repetition and continuance of the pattern of the nation’s 
victimization. They also do not see the conﬂict as new, but view it as the 
perpetuation of “age-old hatreds”, and therefore intractable. The Other then 
becomes the perpetual villain and perpetrator, mired as the “ancient enemy”. 
The participants not only relate to the centuries-long national suﬀering at 
the hand of various Others, but locate themselves within it, as witnesses and 
 Anderson, Imagined communities, . 
 Osborne, “Landscapes”, . 
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participants. They seek meaning and conﬁrmation to their present victim-
ization in historical victimage, and their personal and vernacular testimony 
provides another building block in the construction of the historical victim 
identity. This rhetoric is powerful, because it helps conﬁrm self-perceptions 
and identity, but it also legitimizes national historiography. Since the na-
tional histories of the Serbs and Albanians are incompatible and conﬂicted, 
this leads to the second functions of historical victimage. 
Second function of historical victimage: Denying the Other
As the above narratives illustrate, histories and memories of the Serbs and 
Albanians in Kosovo are in complete contrast and opposition to each other. 
Thus, claiming that one’s version of events is truthful inherently implies that 
the Other’s is not. The Albanian speaker directly asserts this, when he says 
“don’t believe anything they say, because Serbian history is a big lie”, but 
even without such open statements, this sentiment is implied throughout 
the narratives. Because history is vital to the existence of a nation or a com-
munity disputing the Other’s history means denying the very identity of 
the Other. Therefore, as participants strive to validate their historical victim 
status, and simultaneously and inherently the Other’s perpetual villain sta-
tus, they are also struggling over the legitimacy of identity, memories, and 
even their very nation.
The NATO intervention and UN governance of Kosovo, which gave 
de facto independence to the Kosovo Albanians, seriously challenged the 
Serb nation and its perception of historical victim, while ratifying the Al-
banian claims to this status. However, in the Serbian case, because NATO 
was cast as the villain, and because the KFOR troops did not protect the 
Serbian population from Albanian violence after the intervention, it also 
simultaneously conﬁrmed and reinforced the victimage master narrative.
In the Albanian case, NATO’s endorsement of their historical victimage 
 Stef Jansen, “Victims, underdogs and rebels: Discursive practices of resistance in Ser-
bian protest”, Critique of Anthropology , no.  (), –.
 See Judah, Kosovo. Stephen Erlanger, “Serbs driven from Kosovo live bitterly in exile”, 
The New York Times,  September ; R. Fisk, “Serbs murdered by the hundreds since 
‘liberation’ ”, Independent,  November ; A. Gray, “Serbs live in fear in Kosovo’s 
kidnap capital”, Reuters,  September ; Jared Israel, “Why French troops stood by 
as Albanians burned a Serbian village to the ground”, Emperor’s Clothes,  March ,
retrieved  March  from http://emperors-clothes.com
 James P. Gee, “Meaning: choosing, guessing and cultural models”, in James P. Gee, 
ed., Social linguistics and literacies, nd ed. (London: Taylor & Francis, ); R. A. 
Hackett and Y. Zhao, “Challenging a master narrative: peace protest and opinion/edito-
rial discourse in the US press during the Gulf War”, Discourse & Society , no.  (). H. Zdravković, Vernacular Discourses of Historical Victimage 109
provided a basis for justifying violence against the Serbs, which is the third 
function examined in this ideological study.
Third function of historical victimage: Justifying violence 
Unfortunately, the rhetoric of victimage is used not only to satisfy the moral 
demands of a community, but is instrumental in justifying oppression, dis-
crimination and violence against the Other. Hauser suggests that invok-
ing collective memories of victimization is useful in collective mobilization, 
building ethnic cohesion and justifying policies and action, and thus he sees 
it as indispensable in ethnic conﬂict. Writing about Bosnia, he says, “con-
ﬂicting stories of victimization [provide] mutually exclusive justiﬁcations 
for policies and acts of mutual extermination”. Nietzsche explains this as-
pect of victimhood as ressentiment, which Schwartzman calls the negative 
extreme of public memory – revenge.
Since revenge is the privilege of the victim, this becomes the most 
prized, and yet most dangerous identity to lay claims to. Mertus explains 
that this is because “once we see ourselves as victims, we can clearly iden-
tify an enemy. Steeped in our own victimhood, we no longer feel bound by 
moral considerations in becoming perpetrators”. In Kosovo, “both sides 
now feel like victims; both sides now feel entitled to take some liberty in 
“taking back” what is rightfully theirs”. Siber similarly argues that “the 
selective interpretations of history and experience always provide abundant 
“reasons” for rationalizing one’s own behaviour, and proof of guilt can always 
be found in history, if one looks hard enough”. This dynamic leads not only 
to the inability to empathize with the Other, but to the further intractability 
of the conﬂict, through the perpetuation of a vicious cycle of violence.
The relatively frequent power shifts in the region provide the oppor-
tunity for the victim to take “revenge” on the villain. In the course of the 
 Feldman, “Political terror”.
 Hauser, Vernacular voices, .
 Ibid., .
 Richard Schwartzman, “Recovering the lost canon: Public memory and the Holo-
caust”, Rhetoric & Public Address , no.  (), -.
 Mertus, Kosovo, .
 Ibid., .
 Ivan Siber, “Psychological approaches to ethnic conﬂict in the territories of former 
Yugoslavia”, in Dusan Janjic, ed., Ethnic conﬂict management: The case of Yugoslavia (Ra-
venna: Longo Editore, ), .
 T. Pick, “Eastern European militant nationalism: Some causes and measures to coun-
teract it”, Peace and Conﬂict: Journal of Peace Psychology , no.  (), -.Balcanica XXXVI 110
protracted conﬂict in Kosovo, the ethnic minority often becomes the ma-
jority, and vice versa, due to changes in state borders, political systems and 
demographic factors. In such circumstances the new majority always seeks 
to “even the score” for the discrimination to which its group had been pre-
viously subjected. This ideological position is an anchor for both groups’ 
identities and is useful in pursuing particular political goals and claims. It 
is especially functional in justifying acts of violence by the in-group as war-
ranted retribution.
In my larger sample, when Serb participants are reminded of the pol-
icies of Slobodan Milošević, they respond by recalling the centuries of Ser-
bian plight under Muslim Albanian terror and their dominance during the 
communist rule. Similarly, when confronted with the violent crimes per-
petrated by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) against Serbs, and other 
minorities, as well their cultural and religious heritage, the Albanians invoke 
their suﬀering in the s, under Milošević’s rule, and the long-standing 
oppression suﬀered at the hands of the Serbs. 
Unfortunately, these tragic kinds of exclusionary victimage narratives 
are not only used to justify, but also to motivate and provoke violent action. 
This is not speciﬁc only to the Balkans, but is visible and problematic in 
other conﬂicts around the world. They are part of the reason why thousands 
of people die and their deaths are justiﬁed as revenge. However, it is impor-
tant to note that participation and justiﬁcation are not identical, and that 
justiﬁcation does not necessarily lead to involvement. Even though there is 
a thin line, as Feldman contends, between violence and inaction, spectator-
ship and partaking, sharing in the vernacular rhetoric of historical victim-
age, and reproducing it through everyday discourse, does not guarantee that 
people will be propelled to action, as several authors writing about Kosovo 
and the former Yugoslavia have suggested.
Concluding remarks
This ideological study has attempted to problematize explanations that 
posit singular, preferential, and “objective” victimage in relation to conﬂict 
 Donald G. Ellis, “Intercultural communication in intractable ethno-political con-
ﬂict”, in William J. Starosta and G. M. Chen, eds., Taking stock in intercultural com-
munication: Where to now? (International and intercultural communication annual, vol. 
XXVIII, ). 
 Vladimir Goati, “The impact of parliamentary democracy on ethnic relations in Yugo-
slavia, -”, in Dusan Janjic, ed., Ethnic conﬂict management: The case of Yugoslavia
(Ravenna: Longo Editore, ).
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intervention and resolution. It has questioned the interrelationship between 
claiming historical victimage and using national histories, personal and col-
lective memories to substantiate it. 
First, it has argued that looking at history as objective in contrast to 
collective memory as distorted and mythical, leads to selective sanctioning 
of victimage narratives and rigid deﬁnitions of victims and villains, which 
leads to ineﬀective conﬂict intervention and resolution, helping to perpetu-
ate violence. 
Second, looking at vernacular discourses of Kosovo Serbs and Al-
banians this ideological study illustrated how historical victimage is cre-
ated and reproduced in everyday melodramatic “commemoration rituals”.
The analysis demonstrated how oﬃcial historiographies amalgamate with 
personal and collective memories, both regional and national, to produce 
coherent and rational victimage narratives for the speakers. 
Third, it has been pointed out that the historical victim status is desir-
able because it aﬀords emotional, symbolic and political resources, while 
being the villain implies guilt and punishment. Narratives of historical vic-
timage invoke to past to make sense of the present, serve to create harsh 
dichotomies of oppressor/oppressed, through which the Other is delegiti-
mized and becomes the target of violence, justiﬁed as revenge. 
Intractable conﬂict and the inherently hostile relationship toward the 
Other, become embedded in everyday life through vernacular narratives of 
historical victimage. Multi-generational trauma is translated into a victim 
identity, which is given historical proportions. The conﬂict becomes mired 
in ﬁxed binary oppositions of victim versus villain. It is conceptualized and 
understood as a continuous struggle of the innocent suﬀerers against the 
tyranny of the Other. Such rationalizations sustain and perpetuate conﬂict, 
making it even more intractable and impervious to resolution; not only is 
there no room for empathy and implicature, but there is no room for diver-
gent voices and inclusive discourses of victimage. 
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Instead of looking solely at the surface – that is the oﬃcial and elite 
rhetoric – examining the deep and underlying structures of vernacular dis-
courses uncovers the interplay of multiple memories and rhetorical strate-
gies in establishing the Other as the source of all tragedies. Lack of critical 
attention to the complexities of historical victimage rhetoric leads to claims 
of primordial hatred and antagonism, and fails to understand how these ex-
treme emotions arise out of the vernacular discourse of the groups involved. 
This ideological study shows that the conﬂict in Kosovo is not propelled by 
such primordial instincts, but that hatred and violence are constructed as 
legitimate responses to centuries of oppression. By uncovering the complex 
rhetoric of historical victimage in Kosovo it aims to make a modest contri-
bution to the understanding of intractable conﬂict dynamics, which revolve 
around historical victimage. The implications of this study can be applied in 
other conﬂicts, such as Bosnia, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Spain, 
Chechnya, Cyprus, East Africa, East Timor, Turkey, Iraq, and various oth-
ers. The goal is to move us away from simplistic rationalizations, remedies 
and perpetual cycles of violence in these areas.
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